**Online Appendix for**

*Property Without Rights: Origins and Consequences of the Property Rights Gap*

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**Section One: Constructing Ruling Coalitions**

I code two different variables to capture the composition of ruling coalitions. The first is Landowners Excluded. When ruling political elites arelanded elites, are appointed by landed elites, or their rule is fundamentally materially supported by landed elites, I code Landowners Excluded as a “0.” It is otherwise coded as a “1.” The ruling political elite in the latter case of a split should be actively avoiding alliances or significant material support from landed groups. The political elite is composed of key military players and civilian politicians, and is headed by an elected executive under democracy and a dictator or junta under autocracy. While there may be conflicts and machinations even within the political elite, what they share is the power and organizational capacity to run the government. Landed elites, for their part, are those economic elites that own land as a "livelihood,...as financial security (e.g. as a hedge against inflation), as a transfer of wealth across the generations, and as a resource for consumption purposes (e.g. country estates held by urban elites for leisure purposes)" (Ellis 1992, 196).

The second variable that I code to capture the composition of ruling coalitions is Peasants Included. When ruling elites have peasant origins, are appointed by peasant movements, or their rule is fundamentally materially supported by peasants, I code Peasants Included as a “1.” It is otherwise coded “0.”

Together, Landowners Excluded and Peasants Included constitute several possible formations of ruling coalitions: large landowners and peasants can both be excluded from government, landowners can be included and peasants excluded, or peasants can be included and landowners excluded. In no instances in the period of study were both landed elites andpeasants incorporated within the ruling coalition. I code the composition of ruling coalitions using a host of country-level primary and secondary sources.

**Country Specific Sources**

This subsection lists country specific sources for the ruling coalition variables, and notes coding decisions and additional information as relevant.

**Argentina**

Early data are taken from Teichman (2002, fn. 7): "From 1910-1940, 40% of all cabinet appointments went to members of the Rural Society, the organization of large landowners. And for much of the volatile period from 1955-70, particularly under Aramburu, Frondizi, and Guido, big landed, commercial, and industrial interests dominated the significant majority of government posts."

The remainder of the data are taken from Ardanaz et al. (2013), Molinelli et al. (1999), and Bethell (1993). Large landowners remained in Ortiz’s cabinet beyond 1940 until his death in 1942. His Vice President, Ramón Castillo, assumed the presidency and ruled until a coup in 1943. Several short-lived military leaders ruled with narrow coalitions until Perón became president in 1946. Perón relied mainly on industrialists and urban workers for support until he was ousted in a 1955 coup (Ardanaz et al. 2013), though he also built coalitional support from rural workers and peasant communities in the countryside (Bethell 1993, 241). Landed elites and the Rural Society remained powerful in Congress, however, throughout Perón’s tenure (McGuire 1997, 70-71).

The military leaders Levingston (1970-1971) and Lanusse (1971-1973) remained allied with large agricultural interests, consistent with a string of previous military rulers in the 1960s (Ardanaz et al. 2013, Teichman 2002). This changed for a brief period under Juan and Isabel Perón from 1973-1976, who again turned to urban and rural workers and industrials for support, and then returned under the subsequent string of military rulers from Videla to Bignone (Ardanaz et al. 2013). Beginning with Alfonsín in late 1983 and until the Kirchners, a series of civilian leaders from the UCR and Peronist Party have split with landed elites (Ardanaz et al. 2013). These leaders also built their political coalitions overwhelmingly in urban areas, particularly from the middle classes, unions, and informal workers.

*Sources:*

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**Bolivia**

Landed and political elites were fused in the early 1930s. The Chaco War led to challenges to the hacienda system. A series of more radical military officers (Toro and Busch of the "Chaco generation") ruled the country from 1936-39, enacting a labor code and adopting a constitution that stipulated that land ownership was dependent upon landowners' fulfillment of their social responsibilities (Thiesenhusen 1995, 55). Toro and Busch, however, did not directly build peasants into their ruling coalitions.

In 1939, however, senior officers recaptured power, returning traditional political parties and repressing dissent. Oligarchic parties gained a stronger grip on national political power in 1946, ruling amidst strikes and land invasions as the Society of Bolivian Landowners (SRB) won backing for the protection of private property. This ended in 1952 as the MNR seized power through a revolution by capturing key armories in La Paz and distributing weapons to civilians.

From the 1952 revolution until 1979, peasants were a cornerstone of all political coalitions that ruled Bolivia (Klein 1992). This was not broken until Luis García Meza Tejada seized office in 1980, but even then the link with landowners was tenuous.

Siles Zuazo's rule after the return to democracy was built on a coalition of labor leaders, new peasant leaders, various parties of the left, and a group of MIR radical intellectuals (Klein 2011, 239). This gave way to the centrist rule of the MNR in 1985 under Paz Estenssoro. Subsequently elected presidents incorporated landed elite groups such as the increasingly important Santa Cruz elites into their coalitions until Morales and his MAS party was elected in 2005 (Klein 2011). MAS incorporated peasant groups and syndicates into its ruling coalition.

*Sources:*

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Klein, Herbert. 2011. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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**Brazil**

Vargas put an end to landowner hegemony. Landowners nonetheless remained politically powerful, and Vargas enlisted them along with the urban middle class and the proletariat to support his regime (Gordon 2001, 143).

Landed elites were able to maintain their power following the 1946 constitution (Ondetti 2008, 11). The first major split came with the election of Goulart in 1961 (Ondetti 2008, 12). Goulart established corporatist links with the peasant movement, but was ultimately ousted by the military in 1964. The military restricted its coalition's size. Military officers and technocrats were preferred over partisan interests, representatives of economic elites such as landowners, and representatives of popular groups such as peasants. Médici divided his government into military, economic, and political spheres, appointing a chief in each area and cementing the military-technocratic alliance (Skidmore 1988, 108). All actors outside the regime, including landowners, had to work through these chief administrators. The head of economic affairs, Delfim Netto, was a middle-class urbanite (Skidmore 1988, 108). This continued until 1985. As Skidmore (1988, 109) writes, the core of decision-making within Brazil after 1964 was within the officer corps.

The elite split persisted under Sarney until the conservative Collor was elected (Ondetti 2008, 14). Cardoso incorporated conservatives, including landed elite interests, in his coalition (Ondetti 2008, 15). The subsequent PT government under Lula da Silva split from landed elites, and had strong coalitional ties with Brazil’s largest social movement, the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST).

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**Chile**

Carlos Ibáñez del Campo won power in 1927 in a sham election boycotted by the traditional parties, and largely steered his own course. Juan Esteban Montero ruled in 1932, having been elected with the support of Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives. Alessandri became president in 1932 with support from the Radicals, which despite rhetoric supporting workers nonetheless followed its latifundista and capitalist leadership that frequently allied with traditional elites (Petras 1969, 121). Indeed, they joined Alessandri's oligarchic cabinet. The following president, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, was a large landowner (Petras 1969, 121). Juan Antonio Ríos Morales incorporated Socialists in his cabinet, who upheld the hacienda system (Petras 1969, 125). González Videla was elected as a Radical and incorporated Communists in his cabinet along with middle-class Radicals and Liberal members of the oligarchy (Petras 1969, 128). In 1947, however, Videla banned the Communists and turned to the Right for support (Petras 1969, 129-31).

His successor, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1952-58), ran a radically anti-status quo campaign, and gained support of the Agrarian Labor Party and of rural workers and tenant farmers against landowners (Petras 1969, 165-67). The political pendulum then swung the other way under Alessandri (1958-1964), who won office with the support of a coalition of Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives. The Christian Democratic political coalition of Frei excluded landowners (Petras 1969, 205), as did Allende's coalition. At the same time, both actively sought the support of peasants in building their political coalitions (Petras and Merino 1972). Pinochet, by contrast, was supported by landowners.

Pinochet’s democratic successors of the Concertación largely excluded large landowners from their cabinets. At the same time, peasant organizations, through their umbrella organization the Comisión Nacional Campesina, were mostly directly linked to the Concertación’s political coalition (Houtzager and Kurtz 2001, 117).

*Sources:*

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**Colombia**

Liberals and Conservatives from prior to the 1930s up until La Violencia had strong landowner membership (Zamosc 1986). This is true even during López Pumarejo's (1934-38) rule during the "Liberal Hegemony" when he implemented the "Revolución en Marcha" (see also LeGrand 1986). López Pumarejo was the son of one of Colombia's largest coffee merchants, and he himself pursued this profession (Safford 1995, 124). Nonetheless, coffee was produced in various ways, and López Pumarejo chose Alejandro López, a vocal critic of latifundia, as director of the Coffee Federation in 1935 (Safford 1995, 135). López Pumarejo attempted to gain the support of the masses in proposing Law 200 of 1936 (Tai 1974, 170-71). The law was never effectively implemented.

Both parties openly supported the military's seizure of power in 1953. But after Rojas Pinilla sought to increase his power and evidenced a turn toward populist policies – reaching out to an unstable coalition of factory workers, the popular masses, and the military rather than the traditional alliance of landowners, merchants, and bankers – he was overthrown (Palacios 2006, 132). General París Gordillo and a junta of four other generals took power. París appointed prominent members of both the Liberal and Conservative parties as cabinet ministers.

Furthermore, landowners from both parties were empowered in government under the National Front (Albertus and Kaplan 2013, Zamosc 1986). Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), however, attempted to increase land redistribution relative to previous National Front administrations. He was supported by an alliance of some sectors of the bourgeoisie, and also attempted to broaden his popular base of support to peasants (Zamosc 1986, 47-51). Zamosc (1989, 114-15) argues that this was in part to undercut the rise of populism in cities and to support the expansion of industry by gaining the political support of peasants, and perhaps even to build a rural base of electoral support for a future presidential bid after the end of the National Front. To forward these interests, he promoted peasant organization via ANUC and tried to establish a direct corporatist link between the peasantry and the state (Zamosc 1986). His policy efforts were thwarted by the resistance of large landowners from both parties (Dugas 2000, 91). Landowners within his successor Pastrana's administration, by contrast, were decisive in squelching reform attempts (Zamosc 1989, 115).

López Michelsen (1974-78) had been more radical for a time, splitting from the Liberal Party to join the Revolutionary Liberal Movement (MRL), but rejoined the mainstream in the mid-1960s (Zamosc 1986, 39).

Significant land reform was tabled after the dissolution of the National Front and the Chicoral Pact, a formal agreement between large landowners and politicians to halt further attempts at reform (Albertus and Kaplan 2013).

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**Costa Rica**

From 1919-1948, the (National) Republican Party held office. In its early years, the party was led by the coffee oligarchy (Seligson 1987, 164). But with the election of Calderón in 1940, the party radically altered its ideology and took on a populist orientation. Calderón formed a coalitional alliance with the communists in 1943. Calderón's allies won until Figueres overthrew the government in a coup in 1948 (Seligson 1987, 165). Meanwhile, opposition to Calderón and his communist coalition coalesced around the National Union Party headed by Blanco, who took office from 1949-53 (Seligson 1987, 165).

In 1951, Figueres formed the PLN to contest the presidency. The PLN formed a rural base of support (Lapp 2004, 45) and began the push for land reform. Figueres won in 1953. In the ensuing years, the main challenge to the PLN was a loose a coalition of the traditional oligarchy, unions, and Calderón supporters. This coalition only displaced the PLN when united, but unification was frequently short-lived given the divergent goals of the groups that comprised the opposition – first the National Unification Party and then the Social Christian Unity Party (Seligson 1987, 168). The debt crisis that struck in 1982, however, frayed the PLN’s previous coalition as austerity followed by neoliberal policies were implemented (Edalman 1999). Peasants then moved into opposition.

The Social Christian Unity Party, again in power in the 1990s and early 2000s, draws its support primarily from larger rural landowners and conservative urban voters (Dendinger 2009, 66-67).

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**Cuba**

Machado (1925-1932) steadfastly allied with landed interests, and was supported by the US. While Grau's radical nationalist legislation was seen by some as a threat to the wealthy landowners that controlled Cuba's economy, the radical left was in fact the most militantly opposed to his rule. The Communist Party denounced him as a "reactionary leader of the 'bourgeois-landlord government.'" (Hirschfeld 2011, 181). Batista withdrew the army's support from Grau amidst popular unrest and installed Mendieta, who was supported by the US (Staten 2005, 62).

Laredo Brú had the support of conservative Republicans and Nationalists, as well as Batista's support (Domínguez 1978, 99). Starting in the 1930s, social and economic groups did not simply use the political parties as mechanisms to express their differences. Large sugar interests, for instance, used the Sugar Stabilization Institute to influence policies in their favor (Domínguez 1978, 95). No president until the revolution dared to undercut their access to the government (Domínguez 1978, 95). The intent of the regulatory system was to identify all organized social interests, including landed interests, and give them stable access to power (Domínguez 1978, 98). The only group excluded was the poor, including squatters (Domínguez 1978, 98).

Beginning in the mid-1930s, as Domínguez (1978, 98) writes, "So long as it did not challenge the basic structure of the system, competition for political office could be relatively free from political cleavages linked to social and economic interests. Politicians did not run on platforms to expel private groups from government bureaucracies but sought support from anywhere." The military in the mid-1930s provided protection for sugar plantation owners outside of Havana (Staten 2005, 63). While electoral choices, particularly from 1940-52, were fairly independent from choices made by organized social and economic groups, government policy was heavily influenced by pressure groups.

Batista in 1940 called for a constitutional assembly that passed a socially progressive constitution. He was then elected with support from the Communists (since they had little chance of being elected themselves), the US, and nearly all social classes (Rouquié 1987, 176). From 1940-44, Batista had the confidence of wealthy elites (Staten 2005, 65). These elites also had a presence in the national legislature and Senate and could block unfavorable legislation.

The following two presidents, Grau and Soccarás, came from the Auténtico Party. They had a leftist, progressive orientation and had the support of radical student groups (Hirschfeld 2011, 185). Nonetheless, as Domínguez (1978) notes, they also had the support of other social groups. Their administrations were corrupt and focused on gaining control over the gambling sector (Hirschfeld 2011, 190).

Batista launched a coup prior to the 1952 elections and aligned himself with large landowners, cultivating ties with sugar plantation owners and others (Domínguez 1978).

Castro and his rebel army that seized power in 1959 was deeply split from landed elites, and recruited heavily from the peasantry (Álvarez 2004, Valdés Paz 1997). Though many peasants remained on the sidelines, “[t]he Cuban revolution had some peasant leaders and organization” (Domínguez 1978, 437). Castro largely destroyed private landowners, and large landowners have never since been incorporated into the political elite. Instead, Castro ruled with the core of his rebel army, and subsequently through the Communist Party. At the same time, however, the position of peasants in the regime became more tenuous over time. From 1960-1976, the land reform agency INRA absorbed the Ministry of Agriculture, and was headed by either Castro himself or by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (1962-65), a longtime Communist politician and economist. By the time of the Third Peasant Congress in 1967, most peasant groups were forced to give up their political autonomy (especially the National Association of Small Peasants, or ANAP), eroding their position within the regime’s ruling coalition (Domínguez 1978, 448; 451).

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**Dominican Republic**

Trujillo came to power in 1930 from the National Guard, and formed a narrow coalition with support from the military (Turits 2003). Following Trujillo's overthrow, several short-lived military and elected leaders targeted landed elites, including those landed elites who were Trujillo's cronies (Stanfield 1989). Among these were Bonnelly and Bosch, who were from the Dominican Revolutionary Party that drew its support in part from peasants. The exception was the military triumvirate headed by Donald Reid Cabral that overthrew Bosch and his successors (Stanfield 1989). Reid's coup was supported by conservatives (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 130).

When Balaguer came into office in 1966, he took several of Bosch's leftist supporters into his cabinet (Woods 2005, 241), but also brought in landed interests. His National Development Commission was headed by a prominent representative of the landed elite (Stanfield 1989, 308). Nonetheless, his regime narrowed in 1970 and 1974 as he winnowed away opponents and consolidated power in a personalist regime that favored foreign interests (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 150-56).

Balaguer was defeated in a 1978 election by Antonio Gúzman, a wealthy landowner from the PRD. Although Gúzman wanted to nominate another wealthy landowner (Majluta) as his successor, a split within his party led to the nomination of Salvador Jorge Blanco, who was supported largely by the middle and lower classes, including the rural poor (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1983, 545).

Blanco was ultimately hamstrung by having to accept IMF-imposed austerity in the wake of the debt crisis. He also faced political divisions within his own coalition (Betances 2007, 144). The subsequent elections were again won by Balaguer, who ruled again from 1986-96, this time in a more liberal fashion and a wider coalition that included conservative elements such as landed elites.

The period 1996-2008 was dominated mostly by Leonel Fernández from the centrist Dominican Liberation Party. There was no split with landed elites under Fernández, and although land reform continued at a low level, there was no strong emphasis on redistribution. The one exception to Fernández's rule was the period 2000-2004 under Hipólito Mejía, who had been the Minister of Agriculture under Guzmán and had focused on promoting agri-business in addition to rural development.

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**Ecuador**

The Liberals and Conservatives represented contending elite factions and dominated politics beginning in the 19th century (Conaghan 1995, 439). They remained influential into the 1970s. Velasco Ibarra was the exception to largely elite-dominated politics in the 1930s-1940s. Nonetheless, even his early success was due to close ties with traditional elites (Conaghan 1995, 446). The formation of new parties only began in force in the 1950s (Conaghan 1995, 441).

Galo Plaza was US-educated, owned a large cattle ranch near Quito, and ruled in a technocratic fashion from 1948-52. He was replaced by Velasco Ibarra's now more populist, though personalist, rule.

Ponce Enríquez was a former Conservative Party (PCE) member until founding the Social Christian Party in 1951. He represented highland landowners during his presidency (Ameringer 1992, 273), and was from a leading landholding family in the Sierra (Conaghan 1995, 441).

The election of Velasco Ibarra in 1960 brought promises of agrarian reform, but little action was taken after the commission he appointed to study agrarian problems encountered concerted opposition from landholding interests (Redclift 1978, 23). The powerful large landowners associations (*Cámaras de Agricultura*) strongly opposed the redistribution of private land, instead favoring the colonization of state-owned property or frontier areas (Haney and Haney 1987, 12). The subsequent president, Carlos Julio Arosemena promised to enact an agrarian reform by executive decree, but was overthrown in a coup in 1963 that brought to power a narrow military coalition that ruled until 1966.

Yerovi was interim president for most of 1966 until Arosemena was elected late that year. In late 1966, Otto Arosemena was elected. Although he had served as the populist Velasco's vice president, he incorporated Liberals and Conservatives in his cabinet.

In 1968, Velasco Ibarra became president for the fifth time, again as a populist with a personalist strain. President Velasco Ibarra was again ousted by the military in 1972. General Rodríguez Lara and a narrow military coalition seized power. They were replaced by another narrow military faction led by Poveda until democracy was reintroduced in 1979.

Roldós was from Popular Democracy, allied with the popularly-based Concentration of Popular Forces for the 1978 elections (Ameringer 1992, 278). His running mate was Hurtado from Popular Democracy (Ameringer 1992, 278). Popular Democracy began as a Christian Democratic party with clerical and student support, whereas the Concentration of Popular Forces rooted itself in the urban coastal proletariat (Ameringer 1992, 278; 272).

Febres (1984-88) was supported by the conservative Social Christian Party (PSC) (Ameringer 1992, 280). He was replaced by Borja from the socialist Democratic Left party (Ameringer 1992, 274), which counted the rural poor as one base of support. Durán won in the 1992 elections after he split from the PSC to form the more right-leaning Republican Union Party. Bucaram took his place but was shortly impeached and replaced by Alarcón, who did not have a strong ideological affiliation (Ameringer 1992). Mahuad was from the center-left and Noboa from Popular Democracy, though he was placed in power via a coup.

Correa was elected on a populist platform and came to office in 2007. One of his bases of support was among peasants in rural areas, and especially those with indigenous populations.

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**El Salvador**

"Between 1913 and 1927, interlocking family clans with large landholdings dominated the Salvadorean polity" (Almeida 2008, 37). This included figures such as Quiñónez, Regalado, Escalón, and the Meléndez brothers. There was a brief period of liberalization with Romero Bosque from 1927-30. Romero, who had links to the coffee industry, won in the 1927 elections as the only candidate and introduced political reforms. He was backed by the Partido Nacional Democrático, dominated by wealthy families including landed elites.

Arturo Araujo was elected President in 1931. Araujo was a wealthy landholder, and though he cultivated support of the campesino vote during the campaign, he turned his back on land reform after being elected (Wilson 1969). This provoked a campaign of rural protest and violence in 1931.

Following the 1932 crackdown, the state reconfigured itself in a manner that restricted sustained social movements for the next 30 years (Almeida 2008, 35-36). "In the aftermath of the 1932 events, an informal pact emerged in which the military assumed political control and managed the state while agro-export elites focused on economic production" (Almeida 2008, 60). Landed elites nonetheless played a critical role in the military's support coalition. Mason (1986, 503), writes that as of the 1970s, "The Salvadorean state, still controlled by coalitions of the landed oligarchy and the military, has lacked the institutional capacity (and, perhaps, the political will)" to introduce reforms that split up landholdings or otherwise benefit peasants.

A struggle then emerged in the 1970s between the traditional landed oligarchy and their military allies on the one hand, and reformist elements led by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and some progressive members of the military on the other (Mason 1986, 505). The main faction of the military made it clear in the 1972 and 1977 elections that the PDC would not win in the electoral arena. A breakaway military faction then staged a coup in 1979 that instated a junta of civilian politicians and military officers that excluded traditional landed elites (Mason 1986, 505). After some instability in the junta, PDC leader José Napoleon Duarte became the nominal head. Landed elites were still excluded from the junta, as were peasant representatives.

In 1982, the Salvadoran political parties decided that it was time to move on from the rule of the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, or JRG, and decided to install Dr. Álvaro Magaña as head of state. Soon after, both political parties met at Magaña's farm in Apaneca and decided that under Magaña's provisional government, both parties would share in the ministerial posts.

The 1984 and 1985 elections were largely a repeat of the 1982 elections between the Christian Democrats and conservative business elites. McElhinny (2006, 55) writes, “The March 1984 presidential election of the center-right government of Napoleon Duarte…dealt a decisive blow to the FMLN strategy of promoting popular insurrection and fended off complete political control by the extreme right under Roberto D’Aubuisson. Despite irregularities that severely challenged the legitimacy of the result, Duarte’s victory reflected the majority preference for peaceful social change that severely conditioned the political-military strategies of the FMLN.”

The subsequent four elections were won by candidates from the Nationalist Republican Alliance, with ties to landowners (Lindvall-Larson 2000). Presidents from this party ruled from 1989-2009, when FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes was elected.

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**Guatemala**

General Jorge Ubico seized power in 1931 and ruled via the military. Ubico took several steps to lessen his dependence upon and the strength of landed elites, such as rotating appointed governors and abolishing debt peonage, cancelling peasant debts to landlords (Berger 1992, 26-30). Waning support from the US along with increasing popular pressure domestically led Ubico to resign in 1944. Dissident military officers and armed students and urban workers pressed successfully for elections (Thiesenhusen 1995, 74), which were won by Juan José Arévalo. Arévalo built a broad coalition of middle-class parties, ruling absent landed elites and also absent peasant groups in his coalition. He convoked a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution in 1945.

Arbenz followed Arévalo and campaigned in part on land reform, supported by peasant organizations. He was elected in 1951. A US-backed coup in 1954 toppled Arbenz and brought Colonel Castillo Armas to power. Castillo Armas had strong backing and even material help from powerful members of Guatemala's Catholic Church (Steigenga 2001, 68-69), as well as substantial support from the CIA. While the UFCO also supported him, however, "its role in the intervention has been overstated" (Karabell 1999, 107). The intervention was not a result of UFCO's anti-Arbenz campaign; indeed, the US was simultaneously bringing an antitrust suit against the company (Karabell 1999, 107). More important were the local groups that plotted against Arbenz as well as the CIA (Karabell 1999, 107). Indeed, "[t]he elite planters, industrialists, and businessmen who had supported the coup also found themselves locked out of a direct role in Armas' authoritarian government. They were pleased to see the status quo restored to the countryside, but they were not happy that the upstart colonel wielded so much power" (Karabell 1999, 134-35).

When Armas was ousted in a coup, his military rival Ydígoras Fuentes took power. Landowners had supported Ydígoras Fuentes in his campaign against Arbenz in 1950, which he lost (Karabell 1999, 100). Ydígoras had also befriended some of the German nationals that had been expropriated by Ubico during WWII, even returning some of their lands (Friedman 2003, 187). Included in his support group of several military factions were wealthy landowners such as the powerful Roberto Alejo Arzu.

The subsequent president after Ydígoras was overthrown in a coup was Peralta Azurdia. Peralta Azurdia included the right-wing Democratic Institutional Party in his coalition (Ameringer 1992).

Méndez Montenegro was elected in 1966 as a candidate of the Revolutionary Party, which was a progressive political movement built around the democratic reforms of Arévalo (Ameringer 1992, 344), including land reform. When in office, he was forced to concentrate on satisfying powerful traditional elements (Buckman 2012, 192). His successor was Carlos Arana had the right-wing Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) in his coalition. Laugerud also had this powerful right-wing group in his coalition. In 1978 Lucas García came to power in a fraudulent election and empowered right-wing death squads to wipe out peasant and other labor leaders (Buckman 2012, 192).

The relationship between Ríos Montt and landowners was good in the wake of the March 1982 coup (Handy 1984). Ríos Montt had the backing of rightwing landowners and industrialists (CACIF and UNAGRO) (Schirmer 1998, 149). Ríos Montt did, however, shift and adopt a USAID land reform program and threatened to expropriate land. Mejía Victores, his successor, continued the coalition with landowners and suppressed peasant groups.

Upon democratization in 1986, the Christian Democratic Party under Cerezo took power. This party had close ties with the coffee oligarchy and the MLN in the 1950s (Schirmer 1998, 187). It split in the 1960s, and one line supported a developmentalist policy including agrarian reform. Cerezo, however, realized that the party had to come to an agreement with the military if it was to govern. The mainstream party then tacked right, seeking connections with the military and commercial elites and causing a drop in support by the popular sectors (Schirmer 1998, 188).

The subsequent president, Serrano Elías, brought the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS) to power. The MAS was a party of the right and sprung from Serrano's days in the Ríos Montt government. It was a personal vehicle for Serrano and did not seriously engage social and economic issues (Ameringer 1992, 345).

After Serrano's failed auto-coup, Léon Carpio was sworn in as president. Léon had joined the MLN, served under Arana, had been a legal advisor to the Guatemala Association of Sugar Producers, and was involved in Mejía's coup against Ríos Montt.

A peace agreement was signed under president Arzú in 1996, who was from the moderately conservative National Advancement Party (PAN) (Ameringer 1992, 343-44). Portillo was in office from 2000-2004 under the Guatemalan Republican Front, a party that had supported Ríos Montt's candidacy in the 1990 elections. It then joined with the right-wing Democratic Institutional Party in an alliance. Berger, a wealthy landowner, was elected in 2004 from the conservative Grand National Alliance. His successor was Colom from the center-left National Unity of Hope, who garnered substantial support from the poor, including the rural poor.

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**Honduras**

From 1930-1956 (and as far back as the early 1900s), the Liberal Party and National Party dominated Honduran politics. As Ameringer (1992, 373) states, "[p]rominent rural landowners dominated both of these loosely organized, nonideological parties." This continued through Carías (1933-48) to Gálvez (1949-1954), who was a former United Fruit Company lawyer. Following a contentious 1954 election, a longtime friend of Carías named Lozano Díaz seized power and dissolved Congress (Ameringer 1992, 374).

A military coup deposed Lozano Díaz in 1956 and set elections for 1957. The military junta was narrow in scope, not composed of landed elites. Euraque (1996, 67) lists the key actors: “The top conspirators included Colonel Héctor Caraccioli, head of the air force; Major Roberto Gálvez Barnes, minister of development; and General Roque J. Rodríguez, director of the military academy in Tegucigalpa. These officers then organized a military government with General Rodríguez as its apparent leader, primarily because of his seniority.” This was a watershed even in Honduran politics. As Merrill (1995, xxvii) notes, “For the first time, the armed forces acted as an institution rather than as the instrument of a political party or of an individual leader.  For decades to come, the military would act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics.” This was bolstered by a new constitution in 1957 that effectively gave the armed forces autonomy from the executive.

Villeda Morales was elected president on the Liberal Party ticket in 1957. He ran as a moderate reformist, proposing pro-poor policies (Ameringer 1992, 374), though many of these were oriented toward urban areas. His political opponents in the PN and MNR, including landed elites, were divided. Villeda Morales governed without landed elites, but he respected the military's autonomy.

The 1963 election campaign seemed to favor Liberal Party head Modesto Rodas Alvarado, who promised further reforms (Ameringer 1992, 374). Rodas was "the charismatic and fiery former president of the Constitutional Assembly, who promised to large campaign crowds that he would reduce the power of the military" (Bowman 1999). Just prior to the elections, the military launched a coup and López Arellano took power, with support from large landowners (Anderson 1988, 131).

López Arellano stepped down in 1971 and was replaced with a bipartisan National Unity Pact that had a wide coalition (Ameringer 1992, 374). López Arellano, with new political allies, overthrew the government again at the end of 1972. He was supported by labor unions, peasant groups, and progressive businessmen (Ameringer 1992, 374). He was ousted by a group of young dissident military officers in 1975, and replaced by Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro. Melgar headed the new Superior Council of the Armed Forces, which was formed mainly of lieutenant colonels (Schulz 1994, 44).

Melgar's support waned and he was replaced in 1978 by Policarpo Paz García. Military conservatives regained control and aligned with the PNH for support, which was still populated in part by large landowners (Ameringer 1992, 374). National Party politicians directed many government ministries.

Democracy returned in 1982 with the election of Suazo Córdova. He campaigned as a progressive and then allied himself with military chief Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, who wielded power as a strongman until an internal military coup in 1984 (Ameringer 1992, 375). He then attacked democratic institutions against opposition from both major parties. Azcona took office in 1986, but faced factionalized support and formed a governing coalition of both the PLH and PNH (Ameringer 1992, 376). The conservative Callejas then took office in 1990 with broad support from the PNH and the business community (Ameringer 1992, 376).

The subsequent Liberal presidents were split from landowners and opposed by many elites. At the same time, peasant groups were not built into ruling coalitions. PNH candidate Ricardo Maduro took the presidency in 2002, and was succeeded by Manuel Zalaya, a Liberal businessman (Lindvall-Larson 2000).

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**Mexico**

There were three main factions that jockeyed for power during the Mexican Revolution after Porfirio Diaz relinquished power (see, e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2012). The first faction consisted of small farmers from central Mexico that had lost their land during the Porfiriato. Meanwhile, the development of mining, railroads and manufacturing under Diaz generated a powerful fledgling labor movement. Finally, because Diaz had favored an elite group of industrialists and bankers, a contingent of merchants, mine owners, and ranchers from Mexico’s northern states, represented by Alvaro Obregón, opposed the monopoly rights granted to Mexico City’s new powerbrokers.

According to the Mexican historian Daniel Cosío Villegas, during the revolution these groups had "totally swept away not only the political regime of Porfirio Diaz but all of the Porfirian society, that is, the social classes. ...Landowners, urban, and especially agricultural, were almost entirely replaced by new ones" (quoted in Tai 1974, 91).

In the wake of the revolution, Mexico cycled through a series of leaders that alienated one or more of these factions and consequently failed to consolidate power. But in 1924, Plutarco Calles rose to power as Obregón’s handpicked successor through a stolen election that was orchestrated by Mexico’s most important (national) labor organization (CROM), landless peasants, and the military’s senior officers. Calles fastidiously courted these three constituencies, incorporating them in his government. This strategy paid off: Calles proceeded to handpick several puppets as successors and ruled behind the scenes for ten years.

Before voluntarily exiting power, Calles was able to fashion a corporatist arrangement that helped him make credible promises to the new beneficiaries of his policies over the previously favored landed and industrial elites (see Haber et al. 2003). The pillar of this corporatist arrangement was the founding of the PRI by Calles in 1929. Calles invited influential generals, regional elites, nascent industrialists, peasant organizers, and labor bosses to join his new political party. The peasantry became foundational to the regime (Albertus et al. 2016). The PRI soon monopolized Mexican politics, and continued to do so for 71 years. The PRI reassigned property rights and funneled patronage to the rank-and-file (Huntington 1968, 318-22). However, after 1940, a change in political leadership and a stronger position of powerful economic interests in the regime, particularly large commercial agrarian industrialists of the north, shifted policy away from small and ejidal agricultural in favor of commercial agriculture (e.g., Cockroft 1983). Many of these commercial agrarian industrialists had been middle class during the revolution and had risen up the ranks to post-revolutionary leadership positions.

By 1997, the PRI lost the lower house, and it lost the presidency in free and fair elections in 2000 to the PAN candidate, Vicente Fox. The PAN gained much of its support from disaffected economic elites, including large agribusiness owners, that were targeted by the PRI in the wake of the 1982 financial crisis. Fox and the PAN therefore were supported at the top levels by remaining northern landowners. This remained true when Calderón won the presidency under the PAN in 2006.

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**Nicaragua**

Nicaragua's political scene since independence was dominated by infighting between Conservatives – aristocratic landowners, cattle ranchers, and large merchants – and the relatively weaker Liberals, composed of smaller (but not small) landowners and artisans. The persistence of this cleavage along with its geographical dimension, with Conservatives based in Granada and Liberals in León, prevented the development of a strongly unified elite (Thiesenhusen 1995).

The pact of Espino Negro brought fighting Liberals and Conservatives to a negotiated agreement in the late 1920s. The pact protected landowners (Thiesenhusen 1995). Sacasa was elected in 1932, and with support from Liberals and Conservatives signed a pact with the rebel leader Sandino that ended his rebellion in exchange for amnesty and land grants for his supporters (Thiesenhusen 1995). Somoza forced Sacasa from office in a coup in 1936. Somoza appropriated much of the land granted to Sandino and his supporters from Sacasa. Somoza's father, Anastasio Somoza Reyes, was at this time a capitalist coffee grower (Williams 1994, 224). Over the next 20 years until his assassination in 1956, Somoza ruled by repression. Landlords that had been frightened by Sandino and peasant organization during the 1930s vested their faith in Somoza to undermine rural unionization and set labor laws favorable to them (Thiesenhusen 1995, 122).

Upon the elder Somoza's assassination, his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle took over. They continued to have the support of many landowners (Thiesenhusen 1995). The FSLN, founded in the 1960s and stemming from the anti-Somoza student movements, overthrew the Somozas in 1979. The FSLN had strong support from peasants and excluded large landowners from their coalition (Thiesenhusen 1995, Kaimowitz 1989). This endured across their tenure in power. The Sandinistas lost power to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in 1990, who allied with landowners that had lost out under the Sandinistas (Everingham 2001, Thiesenhusen 1995, Stanfield 1995). The next two presidents had been opposed to the Sandinistas, running in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party, which has Liberal Party roots. The second of these, Enrique Bolaños, had his family cotton farm seized by the Sandinistas in the 1980s.

Daniel Ortega, leader of the FSLN, returned to power via elections in 2007, and again his coalition was largely split from landed elites while incorporating peasant groups.

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**Panama**

Panama's early Liberal Party was comprised of three different groups: i) Caribbean immigrants and people of mixed African origin living in the *arrabal*; ii) lower and middle echelon merchants in port cities; and iii) interior landowners, ranchers, and rural landholders of Hispanic descent (Aguirre 2010, 214).

Beginning in the 1920s a socially progressive, reformist (though racist) political group known as Acción Communal was formed around Arnulfo and Harmodio Arias. The party's name changed from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) to the Panamenista party and was the main antagonist of the upper class for decades before Torrijos came to power (Di Tella 2005, 67). It took a definitive populist turn beginning with Arnulfo in 1940 (De Tella 2005, 67), drawing in peasants. The Liberal Party and PNR alternated in power several times between the 1920s and 1951.

Remón Cantera was elected in 1952. In power until 1955, he was supported by a host of parties, some of which counted landed elites in their ranks: the Renewal Party, the Liberal Party (del Matadero), the National Revolutionary Party, the Authentic Revolutionary Party, the Popular Union Party, and the Patriotic Youth Front. These fused to form the National Patriotic Coalition, which had an ill-defined ideology. Remón Cantera's successors, Ricardo Arias (1955-56) and Ernesto de la Guardia (1956-60), counted landed elites within their ruling coalitions. De la Guardia was "a conservative businessman and a member of the oligarchy" (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

In the 1960 election, there were three candidates. All of them, including the winner Chiari of the Liberal Party, were wealthy oligarchs (Harris 1970, 179-89). By the mid-1960s, Meditz and Hanratty (1987) write, "the oligarchy was still tenuously in charge of Panama's political system. Members of the middle class, consisting largely of teachers and government workers, occasionally gained political prominence. Aspiring to upper-class stations, they failed to unite with the lower classes to displace the oligarchy. Students were the most vocal element of the middle class and the group most disposed to speak for the inarticulate poor; as graduates, however, they were generally co-opted by the system." The Liberals retained the presidency in 1964 when Marco Aurelio Robles won the election. Robles had served as minister of the presidency in Chiari's cabinet.

A clear break from landed elites occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos and Major Boris Martínez launched a military coup in 1968 to overthrow Arnulfo Arias, who had been in office less than two weeks. Torrijos became head of the National Guard and the de facto leader of Panama. The Torrijos regime excluded traditional landed elites from its coalition, instead favoring military insiders. Torrijos then reached out to incorporate peasants as a base of support rather than capitalist agro-business (Gandásegui 1985, 216).

After Torrijos' death in 1981, he was succeeded immediately as National Guard commander by the chief of staff, Colonel Florencio Flores Aguilar, a Torrijos loyalist. Flores was forced into retirement in 1982 and replaced by his chief of staff, General Rubén Darío Paredes, who considered himself to be Torrijos's rightful successor (Torrijos had been grooming Paredes for political office since 1975) (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). Paredes was then succeeded by Manuel Noriega, a career military man. Landed elites remained excluded from the top echelon of power, though Noriega also narrowed the ruling coalition to military insiders, divorcing it from peasant interests.

On the 1989 elections, Furlong (1993, 20) writes, "As their candidates, the new coalition [ADO-C] selected Guillermo Endara, who was associated with the original Arnulfo Arias party...to run for president, along with vice-presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderón (of the PDC) and Guillermo Ford (of the MOLIRENA). The Noriega government...chose Carlos Duque to run as candidate for the...PRD, the official government party. When the elections were finally held in May 1989, not only was Duque defeated, but the anti-Noriega forces had won by a margin of more than 2-1. In frustration, Noriega cancelled the results of the election and destroyed all the official ballots." Noriega was shortly thereafter overthrown by a US invasion of Panama.

Endara became president in the wake of the US invasion until 1994; unlike his predecessors Torrijos and Noriega, he only appointed whites to his cabinet. Peasant groups were on the sidelines. Endara's successor was from Torrijos' PRD. Peeler (1998, 91) writes, "[F]ree elections in 1994 brought to the presidency Ernesto Pérez Balladares, head of the old Torrijos-Noriega Party." The subsequent presidents from 1999-2009 were also from the Panamenista and PRD parties, largely split from landed elites. Yet these parties, including the PRD, also were largely split from peasant associations.

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**Paraguay**

From the early 1900s until 1930, large landowners resisted reform via the ruling Liberal Party. The status quo largely persisted despite popular pressure for redistribution from peasants who fought and were injured in the Chaco war with Bolivia, only to be sent back to work on *latifundios*. In 1936, however, Colonel Rafael Franco seized power in 1936 as the head of the Revolutionary *Febrerista* Party (PRF) composed of soldiers, veterans, peasants, and students (Lewis 2006). Large landowners were excluded from the party.

The Liberals overthrew Franco after 18 months in office, and in 1939 chose General Estiggaribia as president after a brief interlude with the consensus civilian leader Félix Paiva in office. Estiggaribia died in a plane crash in 1940, however, and was succeeded by General Morínigo as an interim leader. Morínigo was a career military man. He quickly solidified his power and eliminated rivals, cancelling upcoming elections. The Liberals in Morínigo's cabinet resigned less than a month after he came to power. Morínigo banned political parties and ruled with a narrow military coalition until 1948, though he did bring Febrerista and Colorado party members into his cabinet in 1946.

A brief civil war in 1947 resulted in years of political turmoil. Between 1947 and 1953, Paraguay rotated through 18 different presidents. Alfredo Stroessner seized power in 1954 via a military coup. Stroessner had a narrow cabinet composed primarily of military figures with few regional interests or coherent substantive economic interests (Lewis 1980, 115). They were selected on the basis of loyalty. Stroessner subordinated the Colorado Party under the supervision of the army, and made sure that no single organization became dominant over others (Galván 2012, 86). This included landowners and peasants. Stroessner used a paternalistic, populist strategy with respect to peasants (Hetherington 2009). Sonntag (2001, 136) writes that the Colorado Party "was little more than the political organization of different factions of the armed forces, whose interests happened to coincide with those of the landowners and the small commercial bourgeoisie." This continued with General Rodríguez, Stroessner's successor, and beyond (Sonntag 2001, 136-37). As a result, populist rural policies continued to a large degree despite the economic power of large landowners (Hetherington 2009).

The Colorado Party continued to dominate elections after a 1989 democratic transition until Fernando Lugo won in 2008 under the Patriotic Alliance for Change. The alliance drew part of its coalitional support from peasants.

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**Peru**

Lieutenant-colonel Sánchez Cerro overthrew the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía in 1930, and was subsequently elected in 1931. He quickly allied himself with elite interests, including the powerful agro-export industry on the northern coast (Bertram 1991, 412). A constituent assembly named the decorated military man Óscar Benavides president in 1933 when Sánchez Cerro was assassinated. Benavides' cabinets were dominated by traditional elites with landed and other economic interests (Bertram 1991, 418). Benavides called elections in 1936 but then annulled the unfavorable results. Instead, he dissolved the national assembly and appointed an all-military cabinet with strong backing from traditional elites.

Manuel Prado was elected president in 1939 after Benavides' term in a restricted electoral field in which APRA remained banned. He was the president of one of Peru's largest banks and had substantial holdings in other financial insurance institutions (Masterson 1991, 67). The oligarchic Prado family also had a strong resource base in coastal export agriculture (McClintock 1981, 67). This made him a natural ally of the large agribusinesses that fueled the export sector, particularly the sugar enterprises on the northern coast. Indeed, his vice president was the wealthy *hacendado* Rafael Larco.

President Bustamante came to power in 1945 through democratic elections, leaning heavily on Prado's constituency, the newly legalized support of APRA, and elements of the growing urban middle class and organized labor (Bertram 1991, 425). Upon coming to office, Bustamante's first cabinet nonetheless excluded APRA (Masterson 1991, 93), as well as established elites such as large landowners (Bertram 1991, 426). APRA's influence grew over time within the national congress and within Bustamante's cabinet: its legislative majority brought down Bustamante's first cabinet and won posts in the newly formed cabinet. APRA's harassment of political opponents and alleged support of the assassination of the *La Prensa* director led to another cabinet change in which *apristas* were ousted and the hard-line General Manuel Odría was brought in. Odría bolstered the state's repressive apparatus.

An economic and parliamentary crisis led to the regime’s overthrow in 1948 by General Manuel Odría. Odría’s coup was financed by key business circles and strongly supported by Peru’s oligarchic “forty families” (McClintock 1981, 68-69), which counted the largest landowners in the country among their ranks. The democratic successor to Odría’s rule was again Manuel Prado. His cabinet and Congress were populated with landed elites. Pedro Beltrán, a landowner and the president of the powerful landed elite dominated National Agrarian Society (SNA), was named as the agrarian reform commission chair. Prado elevated Beltrán to the post of prime minister in 1959.

The hectic and indeterminate elections of 1962, which raised the prospect of putting Odría back in office, were cancelled in a coup and rescheduled for the following year. The head of the junta that seized power, General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, was a military man that brought in a strictly military junta and originally called for elections, come what may, and then displayed a desire to remain in office longer. Neither landed elites nor peasants were directly in the political coalition. The prospect of Godoy extending his stay led to another coup in which his original co-conspirator, General Lindley López, overthrew him.

Fernando Belaúnde was democratically elected as president in the 1963 elections that followed quickly after Lindley’s coup. Belaúnde came from an urban family and co-founded the National Democratic Front with Bustamante. He then formed AP and was in office from 1963-68. His political coalition was mostly but not entirely split from landed elites, although the latter were able to stifle the most serious land reform attempts through Congress. Belaúnde’s coalition did, however, draw substantial support from peasants. Key to his 1963 election were not only the Christian Democrats but also the Communists and radical leftists (Ameringer 1992, 513). The latter two had substantial support in rural areas, and Belaúnde kept them in his coalition (though the *Bandera Roja* branch of the Communists later split with him).

In October 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power from Belaúnde with the help of a military coalition of middle-class officers that did not mix in with the exclusive social circles of the landed elite (Albertus 2015). Velasco's coup began the *Docenio*, a period of autocratic rule that lasted until 1980. With the tacit support of many insiders, then Prime Minister General Morales Bermúdez pushed the ailing Velasco out of office in 1975 (McClintock 1983). Morales at first kept many key Velasco advisers such as Rodríguez, Fernández Maldonado, Gallegos, and Graham (Albertus 2015). Many of these advisers, however, left government as Morales introduced policy changes. Despite these later changes, the support coalition still did not overlap substantially with landed elites (Kruijt 1994). The new Minister of Agriculture after Gallegos, General Luis Arbulú Ibáñez (July 1976-July 1979), was a longtime military man.

Belaúnde's second term (1980-85) and Alan García's first term (1985-90) lacked an elite split. The elite groups that remained at the end of military rule played an important role in the transition back to democracy (Conaghan and Malloy 1994), and were therefore important to these governments. This remained true under Fujimori, who was elected in 1990, as well as under Fujimori’s successors through Alan García’s rule from 2006-2011.

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**Uruguay**

Landowners were strongest within the National Party (Blancos) in early 20th century Uruguay. They were not, however, entirely absent from the Colorado Party. In fact, "parts of the coastal landowners supported the nation-building, modernization, and secularization project of Batlle and the Colorado Party" (Huber and Stephens 2012). Landowners split during Batlle's second term (1911-15), most supporting the Blancos but some supporting the Colorados. Until 1929, the strength of the National Party in government along with the strength of conservative factions within the Colorado party "prevented the implementation of any reforms that would have affected landed interests in a significant way" (Huber and Stephens 1995, 201).

Intra-party factionalism eroded this, and the more cosmopolitan faction of the Colorados held the presidency at the outset of the 1930s to the exclusion of most landed elites. The Federación Rural formed in 1929 to pressure against reforms that threatened rural interests (Huber and Stephens 1995, 201). In 1933, under Terra's presidency, a faction of conservative Colorados allied with a faction of Blancos (the Herrerista group) with close ties to landowners to exclude other factions from executive power. This alliance ended in 1942, and the more urban and cosmopolitan faction of the Colorados regained the executive until early 1959.

From 1959-early 1967, the National Party (Blancos) controlled the executive, and landowners wielded power within the ruling coalitions. The conservative wing of the Colorados, which included some large landowners, then captured the presidency from 1967-73 (Cavarozzi 2001, 51-52). Bordaberry implemented an auto-coup by involving the military in 1973, but was pushed out in 1976. The military then ruled with the support of some Colorados (the Pachequist faction) and some Blancos (Aguerrondo's Herrerists) (Hudson and Meditz 1992). The return to democracy following the Naval Club Pact saw the Colorado Party again predominantly capturing the presidency and representing mostly urban interests with the exception of 1990-1995 (National Party rule). This gave way to Frente Amplio victories beginning in 2005, in which landowners played little role. The Frente Amplio’s coalition was built from a host of leftist parties, unions, and movements, including rural workers.

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**Venezuela**

The military strongman Juan Vicente Gómez seized power in Venezuela in 1908 and ruled until 1935. Gómez was a large cattle rancher and was allied with landed elites, particularly those from his favored home state of Táchira. Power remained with the same set of military elite (the "Gomecistas") after Gómez's death in 1935 (Powell 1964, 35). This was true under Generals Eleazer López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita. Both were allied with wealthy military elites and business elites in export agriculture.

A split began to develop within the ruling elite in 1943. President Medina had encouraged military professionalization and permitted opposition political parties and their increasingly volatile protests to function legally during his rule. This caused a rift within the political party that Medina created in 1943, the Partido Democrático de Venezuela. When the more hard line former president López announced his candidacy for the 1945 election and made clear his opposition to the trend toward change, he was immediately backed by much of the conservative elite, splitting Medina’s support. Medina was overthrown in 1945 by a group of younger officers that feared a López victory in upcoming elections.

The successful October 1945 coup conspirators subsequently formed a seven-member ruling junta named the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, which was staffed by four civilians from the nascent political party Acción Democrática (Rómulo Betancourt, Gonzalo Barrios, Luis Beltrán Prieto, and Raúl Leoni), an independent civilian (Edmundo Fernández), and two military officers from the self-fashioned Union Patriótica Militar, or UPM (Carlos Delgado Chalbaud and Mario Vargas). AD leader Rómulo Betancourt presided over the junta. Many of the AD civilians were former student leaders from the Generation of '28, and counted a doctor, political organizer, teacher's union leader, formerly exiled politician, and a lawyer. None were from either oligarchic or peasant families. Landowners loathed AD from the start given that its party platform called for the dissolution of large landholdings (Myers 2004, 15).

Secret, direct elections in December 1947 consolidated AD's political power. Peasants were, for the first time, a cornerstone of an electoral coalition. Rómulo Gallegos, AD's presidential candidate, won the election with 74% of the vote. A military faction led by Pérez Jiménez and Delgado Chalbaud then paired with opposition political leaders to overthrow the AD government in November 1948. Supported by the old landed elite, the new junta severely cracked down on AD (Albertus 2013). Pérez Jiménez consolidated power after Delgado Chalbaud was assassinated in 1950 and dominated the political scene until 1958.

Admiral Larrazábal organized a set of military elite to overthrow Pérez Jiménez in 1958. Larrazábal announced elections four days after coming to office. The December 1958 elections resulted in a victory for AD's Betancourt. Betancourt included COPEI and URD representatives in his cabinet in adherence to the Punto Fijo pact, though URD quit within two years (Neuhouser 1992, 124). COPEI was founded in 1946 as a Christian Democratic party and adversary to AD's leftist and anti-clerical tendencies (Crisp et al. 2003, 275). It was a traditionally conservative party founded by Rafael Caldera that originally represented Catholics, the middle-class right in rural areas, and landed elites (Crisp et al. 2003, 283-84; Lynch 1993, 97), with particularly strong support in the Andes.

AD again won the presidency in 1964 under Raúl Leoni, and by this time had built strong inroads into the peasantry and the main peasant union, the Peasant Federation of Venezuela (FCV). COPEI chose not to accept ministerial posts in Leoni’s government (Neuhouser 1992, 194). Splits within AD then enabled COPEI's Rafael Caldera to capture the presidency in 1968. Caldera chose to govern without a coalition cabinet, which helped to consolidate political competition between AD and COPEI in Venezuela (Crisp 2000, fn 4 p. 236). His first cabinet members contained COPEI, independents, and businessmen (Crisp 2000, 31). The presidency then rotated between AD and COPEI for the next 20 years until Caldera split from COPEI and won office again in 1994 with the support of an amalgamation of smaller parties, though his positions were still representative of COPEI constituents (Coppedge 2000, 114). Throughout this time, peasants were incorporated as a key base of support for all AD administrations (Albertus 2013).

Venezuela’s political system changed dramatically in the 1990s. The charismatic Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998, promising to end the long-term domination of Venezuela’s entrenched political parties that had presided over an extended economic decline. Chávez built much of his electoral support from poor voters, including the rural poor (e.g. Canache 2004, Handlin 2013, Roberts 2003). A former lieutenant colonel, Chávez also empowered the military by enhancing their resources and domestic role and by appointing officers to his cabinet (Trinkunas 2004). By contrast, Chávez largely excluded traditional elites from his political coalition (Handlin 2013, Zúquete 2008). Chávez remained in office until his death in 2013.

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Notes and Links:

* <https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/USAID_Land_Tenure_Afghanistan_Profile.pdf>
* See Table 4.2 in Pryor

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Notes:

* See p. 22 on state aid and support

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Notes:

* El Ghonemy (1992, 217) says private ownership in Bolivia. Binswanger-Mkhize (2009, 66) says restrictions on sales and rentals and low credits.

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Notes:

* See Alston on restrictions to sales; Binswanger on low credit/input support

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Notes:

* See pp. 103-104

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Notes:

* Low then high credit/input support, changing in 1970s (Binswanger and Deininger 1997, 7)

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Notes:

* See pp. 370-71 on restrictions to sales/rentals and inputs/credits

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Notes:

* For interwar reform, see Mathias and Pollard pp. 899-900
* For history of land surveys, see Šíma
* For history of reform, see Macek and Koťátko

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Notes:

* See Thiesenhusen (1995). Starting in the early 1970s, about 1/4 of land reform beneficiaries were assigned to collectives.

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Notes:

* See pp. 112-20

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Notes:

* Kay indicates many state/collective farms

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Notes:

* See pp. 78-81

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Notes:

* See pp. 131-140 on titles and security and closing PR gap

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Notes:

* Low credit/input support (Binswanger and Deininger 1997, 8)

**Hungary:**

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Notes:

* On credits and inputs, see p. 123

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* See Powelson and Stock Ch. 5
* For evaluation of reform, see Platt et al.

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Notes:

* See history of reform in Švābe

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Notes:

* See history of reform in Wegren and Valciukiene

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* See Table 4.2 in Pryor
* On closing PR gap see Myadar (<http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_11.1_myadar.pdf>)

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Notes:

* Kay suggests many state/collective farms
* See Broegard and de Laiglesia on closing PR gap
* See history of reform in Enríquez 1991

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Notes:

* See Thiesenhusen on credits and inputs

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Notes:

* See Swinnen and Pryor: mostly land reform to private farmers
* See Roney on investments in inputs
* See history of reform in Yakowicz and Polish Academy

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Notes:

* Mostly cooperatives rather than collectives early on, but many quickly dissolved

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Notes:

* For interwar reform, see Mathias and Pollard pp. 898-899
* See history of reform in OECD and Cartwright

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Notes:

* High credit/input support (Binswanger and Deininger 1997, 7)

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Notes:

* On U.S. funding, see Robinson p. 92

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Notes:

* High credit/input support: p. 7

**Tanzania:**

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Notes:

* Low credit/input support: Binswanger p. 7; Powelson and Stock Ch. 4

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Notes:

* See Ch. 7

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Notes:

* For interwar reform, see Mathias and Pollard pp. 897-898

**Zimbabwe:**

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Notes:

* Low credit/input support: pp. 68-69

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* <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Afghanistan-protection-of-property-rights>
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* <https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/USAID_Land_Tenure_Afghanistan_Profile.pdf>

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Notes and Links:

* On peasants in governing coalition in 1990s pushing for PR, see Swinnen (1999, 648-649).
* <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/Albania-Policy-Briefs-2013.pdf>
* <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zydi_Teqja/publication/264315029_ALBANIAN_AGRICULTURE_DRAMATIC_CHANGES_FROM_A_VERY_CENTRALIZED_ECONOMY_TO_FREE_MARKET_A_STRATEGY_FOR_FUTURE_DEVELOPMENT/links/53d8b4f40cf2e38c63318c50/ALBANIAN-AGRICULTURE-DRAMATIC-CHANGES-FROM-A-VERY-CENTRALIZED-ECONOMY-TO-FREE-MARKET-A-STRATEGY-FOR-FUTURE-DEVELOPMENT.pdf>

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* See 84-86 in Jorgensen

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* For history of reform, see Macek and Koťátko

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* See Kontogiorgi pp.131-140 on titles and security and closing PR gap

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* See Powelson and Stock Chp. 5

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* See Table 4.2 in Pryor
* On closing PR gap see Myadar (<http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_11.1_myadar.pdf>)
* On peasants in coalition see deMarco’s notes

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* See Albertus Chp. 6

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* For interwar reform, see Cartwright, Vaskela, and pp. 989-99 Mathias and Pollard
* On peasants in coalition see deMarco’s notes

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* On closing PR gap see Udayakantha: <http://www.ips.lk/images/News/2017/31_03_2017_Land/Udayakantha_Land%20Titling.pdf>
* On role of peasants in SLFP coalition, see DeVotta p. 95
* See World Bank and Singh for evaluation of reform

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* See Albertus Chp. 8

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Notes:

* See Chp. 7

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* For interwar reform, see Dovring and pp. 897-898 of Matthias and Pollard.

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* See Albertus Ch. 8